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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis evaluates the recent improvement of Russia's submarine program in 
light of the overall modernization of Russia's undersea capabilities. It is based on a 
combination of qualitative assessments from unclassified official publications from 
Russian maritime defense institutions, historical articles on Soviet submarine 
development, along with their use during the Soviet era, and contemporary studies of 
Russian submarines. It concludes that the Russian Navy is well on its way to replacing an 
aged Soviet submarine force with a smaller but more technologically advanced nuclear 
submarine fleet. Improved Russian submarines are employed in a variety of roles to blunt 
American strategic innovation. Russia's Deep-Water Special Operating Submarines 
(DWSOS) and its Oceanographic Research Vessels (ORV), in particular, are employed to 
reinforce a policy that aims to advance Russia's influence abroad. Russia's navy will 
undoubtedly attempt to counteract any improvements realized by the U.S. Navy to the 
extent it can. In that sense, Russian naval strategy will remain reactive to that of the 
United States and its European neighbors for the foreseeable future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century the Russian Federation produced two 
nuclear submarines, one of which was leased to India.1  In the short period from 2014 to 
2018, however, Russia commissioned 13 nuclear and conventional submarines, a stark 
contrast to the previous decade.2  The modernization of Russia’s undersea capabilities has 
been accompanied by a surge in provocative behavior from Russia. When it became 
evident Western influence would likely gain a better foothold in post-Soviet space, Russia 
engaged post-Soviet Georgia in war in 2008.3  In 2014 Russia concocted a crisis in Ukraine 
and annexed Crimea. The rest of Europe and the United States have refrained from direct 
confrontation. Russia’s revisionist posture in world affairs is now widely and 
understandably taken for granted in the West.  
This thesis seeks to evaluate the improvement of Russia’s submarine program in 
light of these developments, and the newly aggressive policy orientation they represent. 
Submarines were integral to Russian maritime strategy throughout the Cold War as a 
second-strike nuclear force, as a threat the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
trans-Atlantic communications and as coastal defense. While Russian submarines today 
are less numerous than during their Cold War peak, they are stealthier and of overall higher 
quality. Although their role in maintaining Russia’s nuclear deterrent is basically 
unchanged, submarine value in relation to the more aggressive aspects of current Russian 
policy is less clear. This thesis will explore how Russian submarines support Russia’s 
revisionist posture in world affairs generally, and specifically in relation to Russia’s near 
neighbors in the Baltic, the North Atlantic and the Eastern Mediterranean. 
 
 
1Konstantin Bogdanov and Ilya Kramnik, The Russian Navy in the 21st Century: The Legacy and the 
New Path (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2018), 18. 
2 Ihor Kabanenko, “Russian ‘Hybrid War’ Tactics at Sea: Targeting Underwater Communications 
Cables,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 10 (January 2018), 1. 
3 Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2015), 8.  
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A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The overall objective of this literature review is to survey publications on the 
employment of Russian submarines and on how Russia’s overarching strategy for their use 
has changed in the wake of the end of the Cold War. It begins with publications about 
traditional employment of Soviet era submarines, and then moves to the application of 
Russian submarines in the post-Soviet Union era. Finally, it introduces the most intriguing 
changes in Russian post-cold War maritime strategy by an overview of publications that 
center on Russia’s use of submarines and underwater vehicles unconventionally, as another 
appendage of hybrid warfare. 
In review of Soviet submarine usage, author Sergei Chernyavskii states in his 
publication, The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions, which centers on Soviet 
Naval strategy throughout the three decades Admiral Sergei Gorshkov was in power, that 
Stalin understood it to be ill-advised to attempt to directly match the military capabilities 
of the United States, and that a better strategy would be to counter  perceived American 
weaknesses.4   To that end, Stalin envisioned a Soviet maritime strategy as centered around 
medium submarines and cruisers, which could threaten Western sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs).5  
Chernyavskii argues that, following Stalin’s death, the role of submarines in the 
Russian Navy became more prominent. He references statements made by Nikita S. 
Khrushchev, “I believe in submarines. A submarine fleet and naval aviation should be 
made into the main force for a war at sea.”6   Khrushchev’s thinking was reinforced by 
Defense Minister Zhukov, who said, “For the disruption of sea and ocean lines of 
communication a submarine fleet is needed…These objectives cannot be laid upon surface 
ships…To put forth a goal of strengthening the surface fleet is unreasonable…It is not 
needed to build aircraft carriers in the near term.”7  The overarching strategy for Soviet 
 
4 Chernyavskii, Sergei, “The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 28, no. 2 (April 2005): 286–287, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390500088346. 
5 Chernyavskii, 286–287. 
6 Chernyavskii, 287–288. 
7 Chernyavskii, 287–288. 
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submarines was thus to plague the efficient operation of western navies, rather than to seek 
direct confrontation. 
The Soviet Union did have capital ships, and Russia still has a few, but their use is 
not nearly as aggressive as during the Soviet era. The capital ships of the Soviet era served 
as a key component of the bastion strategy, in which submarines concentrated in the 
Barents Sea were protected by surface vessels. In this scheme large surface combatants 
provided safety and a layered defense to Russia’s true capital ships, Ships Submersible 
Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN).8  Russian military journalist Konstantin Bogdanov and Ilya 
Kramnik provide detail on the Russian bastions and consider possible motivations for 
concentrating resources there in their report The Russian Navy in the 21st Century: The 
Legacy and the New Path, which largely “examines the status, mission set, and 
development strategy of the Russian Navy.”9  Bogdanov and Kramnik argue the Arctic 
was a place “where purely economic issues intersect with the missions of forming bastions 
for SSBNs and protecting the green-water zone from the enemy’s submarines,” and today 
the Arctic remains a natural haven for Russian underwater assets due to the difficulty 
presented to the effective employment  of ASW air assets in the region.10  Bogdanov and 
Kramnik conclude that the strategic employment of Russian SSBNs has not shifted from 
the role they served at the collapse of the Soviet Union: “Setting up SSBN bastions during 
a period of threat remains the most crucial element of the navy’s activities.”11  
Konstantin Bogdanov and Ilya Kramnik discuss at length the Russian Navy in the 
21st century. They refer to the Russian Naval document, Foundations 2030, in which 
Russia declares, “Russia will not tolerate the substantial superiority of any other country’s 
navy.”12  This is very much in concert with Rod Thornton’s conclusion “Russia’s admirals 
are now, and as pointed out in Naval Doctrine, engaging in the balance development of the 
 
8 Owen R. Cote Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with 
Soviet Submarines (Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2003). 
9 Bogdanov and Kramnik, The Russian Navy in the 21st Century, 22–23.  
10 Bogdanov and Kramnik, i.  
11 Bogdanov and Kramnik, 22. 
12 Bogdanov and Kramnik, 20. 
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Navy with the aim of not allowing the significant superiority of the U.S. Navy.”13  
Perceptions of foreign naval capabilities appear to be a prime mover in Russian maritime 
strategy, independent of whatever threats such navies may pose. Russia naval doctrine 
today may thus contain an element innovative posturing as a mask for structural weakness, 
as it did under Stalin. 
In an effort to forecast what the Russian submarine force of tomorrow will look 
like, it is helpful to consider what is called the “major naval salon,” held St. Petersburg 
every two years.14  This event brings together foreign and domestic ship builders along 
with representatives from the Russian Navy.15  During the 2017 major naval salon, the 
Russian Navy representatives expressed the desire to increase the size of the smallest ships 
in current inventory, while also shelving large ship building projects greater than 8,000 
tons.16  This suggests that the strategic composition of the Russian Navy is in a changing 
state, and the status quo may not continue. 
The 2017 major navy salon suggests that belief in the utility of submarines remains 
strong amongst Russian naval leadership. Admiral Bursuk announced at the naval salon, 
the Navy will procure two more Project 677 (Lada class) diesel submarines.17  
Additionally, he announced the commencement of construction for two Project 636.3 
(Improved Kilo class) diesel submarines, and the sixth Yasen-M nuclear submarine was 
scheduled to be down in July.18  Admiral Bursuk’s remarks reinforce Thornton’s view that 
“this move toward smaller platforms reflects the asymmetric philosophy that dominates 
much of the overall strategic, operational, and tactical thinking of today’s Russian armed 
 
13 Rob Thornton, “Countering Prompt Global Strike: The Russian Military Presence in Syria and the 
Eastern Mediterranean and Its Strategic Deterrence Role,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 32:1, 
(January 2019): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2019.1552655. 
14 Dmitry Gorenburg, “What We Learned from the Russian Naval Salon (MBMC-2017),” 
WorldPress, last modified July 11, 2017, https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2017/07/11/what-we-learned-
from-the-russian-naval-salon-мвмс-2017/. 
15 Gorenburg, “What We Learned from the Russian Naval Salon (MSBMC-2017).” 
16 Gorenburg. 
17 Gorenburg. 
18 Gorenburg.  
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forces.”19  From 2014 to 2018, Russia commissioned 13 submarines.20  This starkly 
contrast to the 2000s, which only saw the commissioning of one nuclear submarine.21  
Some of these submarines are multi-mission capable, such as inserting special forces 
covertly, and also be able to conduct conventional anti-submarine and anti-surface 
missions.  
Michael Kofman discusses how critical these Russian submarines are in Russian 
maritime strategy. He says, “Russian strategic operations envision conventional strikes, 
single or grouped, against critical economic, military, or political objects. These may be 
followed by nuclear demonstration, limited nuclear strikes, and theater nuclear warfare.”22   
Kofman’s statements are consistent with the document “Fundamentals of the State Policy 
of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” 
which states, “With the development of high-precision weapons, the Navy faces a 
qualitatively new objective: destruction of enemy’s military and economic potential by 
striking its vital facilities from the sea.”23    
Kofman goes on further to say, “Yasen-class, and others able to deliver nuclear 
tipped cruise missiles to distant shores, should be considered as important elements of sea-
based nuclear deterrence at a different phase of conflict, and perhaps no less consequential 
than SSBNs.”24  Therefore, large Russian surface vessels such as the Admiral Kuznetsov 
Aircraft Carrier (CV) and Pyotr Velikiy Guided Missile Cruiser (CG) still serve a purpose, 
but their role has receded due to the deterrence Russian underwater assets are able to 
provide more efficiently.  
 
19 Thornton, “Countering Prompt Global Strike,” 17. 
20  Kabanenko, “Russian ‘Hybrid War’ Tactics at Sea,” 4.  
21 Bogdanov and Kramnik, The Russian Navy in the 21st Century, 18. 
22 Michael Kofman, “The Role of Nuclear Forces in Russian Maritime Strategy,” The Future of the 
Undersea, (March 2020): 6, https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2020/03/12/the-role-of-nuclear-
forces-in-russian-maritime-strategy/. 
23 Russia Maritime Studies Institute, Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in 
the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2017) 
24 Kofman, “The Role of Nuclear Forces in Russian Maritime Strategy,” 6.  
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Thornton’s general conclusion, that Russia desires to keep opposing navies 
unbalanced, or simply to create mismatches, can be applied to the use of Russia’s 
submarine operations today. Russia has shown a demonstration of faith in hybrid warfare. 
Ihor Kabanenko details a few scenarios in which Russia could conduct hybrid warfare 
underwater. Now that historic context has been provided, from here fourth this literature 
review will shift to undersea hybrid warfare. Kabanenko says Russia’s aim for some of its 
multi-mission submarines is to tap undersea cables or demonstrate the capability of being 
able to sever undersea cables.25  Russian submarines can easily wreak havoc to undersea 
cables. Two specialty submarines belonging to Russia’s Deep-Water Special Operations 
Submarines (DWSOS), which could be employed for missions of sabotage are the Losharik 
and Paltus.26    
Likely the most capable of the DWSOS is Losharik, which was commissioned in 
2006 and is capable of diving to the depth of 20,000 feet. Kabanenko says this specific 
vessel is capable of destroying seabed infrastructure, and undersea cables.27  These 
DWSOS have a limited range and require a ‘mothership’ to transport them to the location 
of the mission. Kabanenko refers to these motherships as carriers, and concludes Russia is 
actively increasing the number of DWSOS carriers in its fleet.28  
Kabanenko points out, under the guise of oceanographic research, Russia has been 
able to operate advanced underwater drones while claiming Russia is conducting scientific 
research. Russia can utilize advanced underwater drones to better understand any change 
in thickness of ice in the arctic, which has been crucial to the Russian bastion strategy; or 
accurately map the ocean floor, which could aid navigation.  
One of Russia’s most advanced Oceanographic Research Vessel (ORV), the 
Yantar. Its true mission is likely more nefarious than Russia would like to admit.  However, 
it is recognized to be an intelligence-collection vessel, and it is outfitted with two Manned 
 
25 Ihor Kabanenko, “Russian ‘Hybrid War’ Tactics at Sea: Targeting Underwater Communications 
Cables,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 10 (January 2018): 3. 
26 Kabanenko, 2.  
27 Kabanenko, 2. 
28 Kabanenko, 2.  
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Underwater Vehicles (MUV), well suited for underwater hybrid warfare.29  The Yantar’s 
MUVs are capable of cutting cables, and also are able to operate Remotely Operated 
Underwater Drones (ROUD), which can perform a variety of underwater task to include 
destruction of fixed underwater hydrophones.30  Kabanenko confirmed the Yantar, in 2015 
was located near undersea military communication trunk lines and nodes for a United 
States nuclear missile submarine base.31  Additionally, it was observed near undersea 
communication cables near the Syrian coast.32  Therefore, it is evident from previous 
deployments, the Yantar’s missions align it more closely to hybrid warfare than scientific 
research. 
It is evident Russia trains its submarines and remote vehicles to prod assets that are 
not easily defendable. If Russia applied its submarines to destroy or manipulate hard to 
defend assets, it may be tricky for the West to deliver a measured response which does not 
escalate the situation. However, this could further compound problems for the West, 
because such a measured response may not deter Russia from conducting hybrid warfare 
in a different medium or to other assets. Russia could likely use its undersea assets to 
decrease the ability of allies to communicate, or to increase the burden of repairing fixed 
assets on the seabed floor. The latter may result in continuous adaption and reactionary 
projects for the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress to review and consider, and 
ultimately expend additional resources.  
Russia has certainly surveyed for soft spots in defense perimeters where it could 
conduct hybrid warfare in the underwater theater. It is all too likely Russia will continue to 
use what was once largely viewed as mission specific defense assets with one or two 
primary missions, like submarines, for a wide array of unconventional applications to 
create mismatches with conventional force. 
 






The current literature on the strategic role of Russian submarines emphasizes their 
role as deterrents against attack from the United States (U.S.)  Russian submarines may 
attempt to execute this role by patrolling within the maximum range of their weapons and 
holding large economic infrastructure as potential targets. Specialty submarines in the 
Russian fleet may contribute to deterrence by threating critical seabed infrastructures, 
which is aligned with Russia’s campaign of hybrid warfare. Submarines also serve to 
enlarge and reinforce Russian Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/D2) capabilities in areas vital 
to Russian interest. This can be accomplished by employing submarines as part of layered 
defensive systems in the Baltic, North Atlantic and Eastern Mediterranean.  
The central question respecting Russia’s submarine program is how far it is 
intended to support more aggressive strategies. Russia has demonstrated its willingness 
and ability to wage “hybrid” warfare for aggressive purposes on land. This thesis will 
consider whether Russia’s expanding fleet of submarines, and particularly its specialty 
submarines, will provide the means to extend hybrid warfare to the undersea theater. If so, 
it would represent a major departure from the status quo. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research for this thesis will mainly consist of qualitative assessments from 
unclassified official publications, particularly those originating from Russian maritime 
defense institutions, and an example is Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030, which was produced 
by the Russia Maritime Studies Institute. It goes without saying that documents purporting 
to discuss the strategic objectives and priorities of the Russian Navy demand critical 
scrutiny, since they never give explicit voice to aggressive intentions. For this reason, they 
must also be weighed against current capabilities. This thesis will also have a historical 
dimension, to the extent that submarine development and use during the Soviet era remain 
foundational to Russian naval thought and practice today. 
9 
D. OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first lays out the argument—that current 
Russian submarine program is, at a minimum, consistent with the prosecution of hybrid 
warfare at sea. It also frames the current program with reference to the crucial role that 
submarines have played during the Soviet era, when multipurpose nuclear submarines were 
initially armed with ballistic and cruise missiles of assorted capabilities and a variety of 
torpedoes to combat aircraft carrier attack groups and adversarial  submarines.33  Attack 
submarines also protected SSBNs in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. All these 
missions continue into the present. This overview establishes a broad understanding of the 
kind of roles submarines may be expected to play given Russia’s current perception of 
threats and opportunities. 
Chapter II considers the improving capabilities of attack submarines, which may 
allow for mission sets different from traditional ones. For example, it is probable Nuclear 
Powered Attack Submarines (SSN) will be a key pillar in the Joint State System of 
Underwater and Surface Surveillance. The system seeks to establish an analog to the U.S. 
next-generation Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) system. Specifically, Bogdanov and 
Kramnik suggest, “the system collects and analyzes data from the automatized seafloor 
stations equipped with multi-element active and passive hydroacoustic reconnaissance 
systems.”34  A fundamental difference between SOSUS and the Joint State System of 
Underwater and Surface Surveillance, is that the latter system of hydrophones are not fixed 
but delivered from submarines to specified regions.35    
Additionally, Chapter II will illustrate the capabilities of SSBNs that might allow 
for missions that vary from their traditional role. However, the content that centers on 
SSBNs will be minor in comparison to that of attack submarines. As mentioned earlier, 
SSBNs have long been equipped with long-range cruise missile. Future SSBNs may also 
 
33 Chernyavskii, “The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions,” 293. 
34 Bogdanov and Kramnik, The Russian Navy in the 21st Century, 25.  
35 Bogdanov and Kramnik, 25. 
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be equipped with unmanned vehicles.36  This additional capability will certainly open up 
SSBNS to a wider range of missions.   
Chapter III’s objective is to depict Russia capabilities relevant to the special 
submarines that might allow for unconventional missions. Bogdanov and Kramnik suggest 
a whole new class of submarine is likely in the conception stage and may be a force 
multiplier in hybrid warfare. They say speculation of a fifth-generation nuclear submarine 
in Russia began to circulate between 2013–2014, which included some media outlets 
reporting there was preparations for building a “universal” submarine, which shares the 
characteristics of strategic and multipurpose platforms.37  The media has circulated the 
name “Husky” as the identifier for this prospective fifth generation universal submarine, 
which “will be developed as a combat system with broad utilization of autonomous and 
unmanned underwater vehicles.”38 
Chapter IV analyzes how those new or reimagined capabilities might apply in 
hybrid war. As previously stated, between 2014 and 2017, Russia commissioned thirteen 
submarines. These vessels can carry out a variety offensive and multipurpose missions, as 
well as the insertion of special forces for missions against adversary’s maritime 
infrastructure.39  Additionally, the Losharik and Paltus could certainly disrupt undersea 
communications and interrupt the vital flow of information amongst Western allies. 
Chapter V considers how the U.S. could potentially respond to Russian hybrid 
warfare undersea. This section means to demonstrate how Russian hybrid warfare may 
place the U.S. in an operational/political/strategic dilemma. The U.S. would have to react 
to direction changes from Russia, which could ultimately give the international community 
an impression the U.S. is flatfooted in times of turmoil. Such sentiments could erode the 
prestige of the U.S. internationally. A few ways the U.S. could respond to Russian undersea 
aggression include not directly confronting Russia but elect to make an official statement 
 
36 Bogdanov and Kramnik, The Russian Navy in the 21st Century, 23. 
37 Bogdanov and Kramnik, 27. 
38 Bogdanov and Kramnik, 27. 
39 Kabanenko, “Russian ‘Hybrid War’ Tactics at Sea,” 1  Ihor Kabanenko, “Russian ‘Hybrid War’ 
Tactics at Sea: Targeting Underwater Communications Cables,” n.d., 5. 
11 
condemning behavior that does not coincide with international norms. The U.S. could 
apply numerous sanctions to key oligarchs or prominent business in Russia to punish 
Russia’s elite. However, any response the U.S. were to choose, would likely fall short of 
escalating the already cool, and noncooperative, relationship between the two countries 
and attempt to avoid direct conflict. 
  
12 
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II. IMPROVED MULTIPURPOSE SUBMARINES AND SSBNS 
A majority of Soviet military and political leaders between the 1950s and 1970s 
believed a war with the U.S. would likely result in unrestricted use of nuclear weapons at 
the onset of a conflict.40  Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, however, dismissed the possibility of 
an unrestrained nuclear war. He once remarked that Soviet Union’s SSBN development 
became a “‘ritual dance’ of grand, and ever more virtual, politics.’”41 Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, Soviet submarine development continued to be the realization of this 
‘ritual dance,’ which centered around SSBN development.  
Routine production and design complacency during the Cold War culminated in 
capital submarines like the Delta IV and Typhoon going to sea with obvious flaws.42  For 
example, Delta IV’s hull design featured a prominent ‘hump’ that nearly obstructed its 
conning tower.43  Typhoon’s excessive girth earned it the nickname vodovoz, meaning 
“water carrier.”  While produced in response to the American Trident class, Typhoon boats 
were of an unconventional size and thus were primarily a political instrument.44   
The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) has made noticeable progress in the 
replacement of these Soviet era submarines with successors that are largely updated and 
demonstrate an overall improvement in quality. Delta IVs and Typhoons have been 
replaced by the fourth generation Borei-class submarines (project 955 “Borei”).45  
Additionally, Sierra-class (project 945) and Akula-class (project 971) are being phased out 
by the Yasen-class nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines (project 885 “Yasen”). An 
obvious strength of the Yasen-class is the submarine’s operational flexibility. Yasen-class 
submarines fulfill the role of both SSN and that of a Nuclear Powered Cruise Missile 
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Submarine (SSGN).46  This move toward multi-task functionality is especially noteworthy 
because diversification in a submarine’s mission capability may result in the realization of 
considerable tactical and strategic leverage on the 21st century battlefield.  
This chapter seeks to evaluate the recent improvements across the two main pillars 
of Russia’s overall submarine program: attack submarines and SSBNs. An evaluation to 
the improvement in these different undersea platforms will render better understanding 
Russia’s overall undersea capabilities. Furthermore, the evaluation of Russia’s improved 
undersea program may demonstrate Russia’s increasing ability to conduct mission sets 
different from traditional ones.  
A. ATTACK SUBMARINES 
Traditionally, Russia’s attack submarines are commissioned to serve as lethal 
bulwarks for SSBNs. Today’s Yasen-class submarines are charged with defending Russian 
Boery boats, to preserve Russia’s nuclear triad. Severodvinsk’s Commanding Officer, 
Roman Sanatarchuk detailed the Severodvinsk’s mission, in which he stated: 
We ensure their combat stability. Drawing a parallel with aviation, they are 
the heavy bombers, and we are both the fighters providing cover and the 
ground attack aircraft at once. If the enemy decides to bare their teeth, we 
can approach and deliver a strike with high-precision weapons—Kalibir 
cruise missiles.47 
In the past several years, however, NATO and the U.S. have witnessed the unmooring of 
Russian attack submarines from traditional missions, such as guarding SSBNs.  
Russian attack submarines homeported in Russia’s Northern Fleet (NF), based on 
the Kola Peninsula, are primarily used as a first line of defense from northern approaches 
to Russia.48  The NF’s piers are increasingly vacant, however, and its submarines routinely 
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look past threats that may arise from the north and focus their ambitions to the south, past 
the Norwegian Sea and Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. In the depths of 
the Atlantic, Russian attack submarines play a critical role in an ongoing demonstration of 
power projection. For example, in late 2019, Russia executed one of its largest naval 
exercises since the Soviet era, in which 10 submarines deployed from Russia’s Arctic coast 
and crept into the North Atlantic.49  Vice Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev, Commander of 
the Northern Fleet, confirmed the influx in Russian underwater activity and stated, “Russia 
was regularly carrying out naval exercises with 10 or more submarines and expanding the 
geographic range of its exercise to include waters beyond its home base.”50   
Partly in response to the proliferation in Russian submarine activity, the U.S. has 
positioned multiple P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft in Iceland. The Poseidon is the 
most capable aircraft to pursue Russia’s quiet submarines and to aid maintenance of a 
robust maritime picture.51  The U.S.’s allies have also demonstrated their confidence in the 
aircraft. Norway has ordered five P-8A Poseidons, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) nine.52  
The aircraft’s speed and endurance make it an obvious choice to assist in patrolling the 
region surrounding the GIUK gap. To transit south from the Kola Peninsula to the Atlantic, 
the Russian Northern Fleet must pass through the GIUK gap, a strategic choke point that 
restricts a submarine’s options in transit. Furthermore, the GIUK choke point simplifies 
the search burden of maritime patrol aircraft.  
The U.S. Navy has reestablished the Second Fleet Command to manage the 
increase in power projection from the RFN. The U.S. Second Fleet Command is 
predominantly responsible for the oversight of maritime activity across both the Atlantic 
and Arctic oceans. Commander of U.S. Second Fleet, Vice Admiral Andrew Lewis, 
commented on what appears to be a growing predicament that Russian encroachment has 







entering a contested space and could no longer expect to cross the Atlantic unhindered.”53  
This is a significant change to the long-standing realities of the theater. The Atlantic was 
chiefly a maritime refuge following the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (U.S.S.R.). Until recently, non-NATO submarine activity was greatly reduced 
from previous level. U.S. and NATO have witnessed the budding determination from 
Russian attack submarines to probe the Atlantic’s theater’s integrity for softs spots in the 
detection from undersea surveillance apparatuses and other western defense assets. They 
methodically survey the ocean’s vastness in near silence in an attempt to discover areas, in 
which the environment will maintain the secrecy of their presence.   
Adding to the U.S.’s growing dissatisfaction with the presence of Russian 
submarines in the Atlantic, the RFNs multipurpose submarines may be poised to receive 
upgraded Futlyar torpedoes.54  Detailed technical information on the Futlyar torpedoes 
have not been made public, but they are expected to have a max speed of approximately 
65 knots, and a max range of 37 miles.55  Additionally, missiles on board Russia’s attack 
submarines are likely to be upgraded as well, though a scheduled upgrade does not appear 
to be imminent. Igor Krylov, the general director of the lead underwater Region GNPP, 
declared there is the ongoing development of a new submarine missile, Khishchnik or 
Predator, into which 20 million dollars have been invested.56  It is possible Khishnik may 
not come to full fruition, however, it is evident that the RFN is eager to continue the 
evolution of Yasen-class submarines. 
Russia has projected considerable power into the Atlantic, though it has not 
remotely gained strategic control. Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, Admiral 
James Foggo, confirmed as much stating, “We still have an advantage in the undersea 
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domain, but they’re very good at their tradecraft”.57  Furthermore, regardless of Russian 
submarine’s expected upgrade, they are certainly not invincible. Their operations can be 
exposed by exploitation of at least one subtle vulnerability. Nuclear submarines on average, 
operate at a depth of around 55 fathoms and can still maintain communications with the 
help of towed radio antennas.58  Operations at this depth, however, leaves behind the 
submarine’s signature in the form of a wake created by their propellers. The wake may not 
be observed with ease at sea level, but the wake’s disturbance can often be detected by 
satellites.59   The unmasking of a submarine from a satellite is not a foregone conclusion, 
however. The environment can act as a discriminating factor as natural forces such as cloud 
cover can create additional sanctuary for undersea threats.  
B. SSBNS 
Both Project 955 Borei and Project 885 Yasen nuclear submarines have undergone 
testing of an innovative technology that may increase their tactical prowess and strategic 
significance.60  The new concept is Unguided Rocket-Projectiles.61  Unguided Rocket-
Projectiles are launched from a submarine, designed to break open the Arctic ice, in which 
they operate.62  The breakup of ice from the projectiles are likely to be tactically 
advantageous for submarine commanders. The ability to break up ice without restraint may 
eliminate the necessity of using the submarine’s hull to punch through it, which can result 
in damage to the submarine. Furthermore, a failed breach may temporarily trap the 
submarine in ice. In a trapped state, a submarine can only render limited tactical value to 
theater commanders. 
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The projectiles may reduce the overall constraint the environment places on 
submarine employment and their commanders. Asserting the significance of the 
innovation, Rear-Admiral Vsevolod Khmyrov, a Hero of Russia and prior submarine 
commander stated:  
After the arrival of the command about the employment of weapons, they 
are obliged to execute it as soon as possible. And ice should not become an 
impediment to doing this. Making ice holes—is one of the tactical 
techniques, which permits the conduct of a missile attack at the needed 
time.63 
The development of Unguided Rocket-Projectiles adds a tactical ripple to 
submarines operating under the already complex environment of the Arctic. The Arctic has 
long been an arena for rival submarine commanders to showcase their prowess and use the 
harsh environment to mask their presence. For example, Typhoon-class submarines thrived 
in the Arctic region under the ice. The hulking submarine employed a technique termed by 
the U.S. Navy as ‘ice picking,’ which allowed them to refrain from using their propellers 
and remain quiet while slowly drifting for long stretches of time immediately beneath the 
ice.64  
Modification of patterns in the location of SSBN deployment is plausible following 
the adaption of NRS into Russia’s submarine force. Due to the possibility of submarines 
suffering damage from breaching through ice, Khmyrov remarked, “usually, if time 
permits, the missile submarines look for already existing ice holes or sail out beyond the 
edge of the ice.”65  Submarine commanders may become liberated from past seasonal 
operation tethers due to the less hazardous method of ice-breaching at hand.  
NRS could alter Russian submarine doctrine, in which submarine commanders 
acquire increased flexibility in their operational range for routine activity such as the 
transmission of information or critical missions such as a missile launch. This is potentially 
problematic to the U.S. and NATO’s submarine force due to the possibility that Russia 
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may alter the traditional operational behavior of its submarines. Such a  revision would 
require the U.S. and NATO to adjust forces. Previously known good areas for contact 
detection may prove to be fruitless in the future. More consequentially, an alteration for 
asset allocation such as fleet assignments may become necessary. 
The Arctic region is likely to continue serving as a haven for Russian submarines 
for the foreseeable future, and even more so with the conception of NRS. The thick layer 
of ice effectively eliminates the threat of harassment by Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
aircraft or detection from a NATO Surface Action Group (SAG). Lastly, Russia is a natural 
energy superpower, and has too much to lose by withdrawing its submarines from the 
region. For example, Putin remarked in 2017 that Russia’s prosperity is in the Arctic 
region.66 He approximated the Artic region harbored roughly $35 trillion worth of oil, gas, 
and other precious minerals.67  Furthermore, 50 percent of the Arctic coast borders the 
northern territory of Russia, therefore Russia’s economic interest connects directly with 
the bastions for SSBNs.68      
C. CONCLUSION 
The RFN has noticeably improved the quality of its submarine force. Borei- and 
Yasen-class submarines are products of considerable determination and genuine 
innovation. Yasen submarines are equipped with ten torpedo tubes, and its torpedo delivery 
mechanism has been reimagined.69  Russian submarines in the past have launched torpedos 
from an air layout apparatus, whereas the Yasen-class utilizes a hydrodynamic one, which 
is reported to be effectively silent.70  The aural signature of torpedoes starting up and 
homing onto a target is unmistakable, and often instantly recognized. The use of a torpedo 
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launching mechanism that is nearly undetectable denies the target platform a few additional 
seconds for executing its emergency evasion maneuvers and tactics. 
Borei SSBNs are an overall improvement from their predecessors, but it is the 
Yasen that is a force multiplier. The Yasens are recognized by the U.S. and NATO as the 
main opponent of Seawolf and Virginia submarines.71 Michael Kofman, a senior research 
scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses commented on the RFN apparent improvements, 
stating, “Russia is the U.S.’s closest near-peer adversary and the challenge to keep abreast 
with their developments is very real”.72 
Russia has taken advantage of these improved submarines and overwhelmingly put 
them to sea in areas distant from its territorial seas. How is this related to the impression 
that Russia seems to insist on the creation of a sequel to the Cold War?  One answer could 
simply be that Russia has modernized its submarine force and now has the capabilities to 
do so. Russian attack submarines are of exceptional quality and represent a new challenge 
to western forces. Mike Petersen, director of the Russia Maritime Studies Institute at the 
U.S. Naval War College, commented on Russia’s attack submarines and stated, they “are 
the most lethal, the stealthiest and have the longest endurance, among the naval forces -- 
they are their ace in the hole”.73  In concert with Petersen’s remarks about the quality of 
Russia’s submarines, Sanatarchuk stated: 
This boat is very quiet; much quieter, than the ships of the majority of 
foreign competitors. The cruise weapons make it possible to operate it from 
distant ranges, and we detect the potential targets much earlier, than they 
detect us. In addition, the boat will soon be upgraded to carry hypersonic 
missiles.74   
Now that Russia has an “ace in the hole,” it is reasonable to expect it to be used. 
Yasen-class submarines that can cause consternation in the Atlantic are complimentary to 
President Putin’s foreign policy, which has pivoted away from Western-led globalization 
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to geopolitics.75  Putin disavows “Western-led moral interventionism,” and seeks to 
destabilize a world that supports a unipolar hegemonic power.76  Political Scientist and 
Russian expert, Dimitar Bechev claims, Russia’s foreign policy “is playing a weak hand 
the best way possible”.77  If Russia is indeed optimizing its poor cards, the demonstration 
of Yasens in the Atlantic is a more sensible approach than a foolish attempt to match the 
U.S. conventionally in the procurement of aircraft carriers.  
An alternate explanation for Russia’s prolific submarine activity in the Atlantic is 
that the Kremlin may simply be determined for the RFN to maintain its place as a naval 
force to be reckoned with. In Foundations of the Russian Federation Naval Policy Until 
2030, the document “declares that the Russian Navy strives to rate second among the 
world’s naval fleets, all the while formulating this declaration in an uncompromising way: 
‘Russia will not tolerate the substantial superiority of any other country’s navy.’”78  
Without doubt, the U.S. Navy will remain the most formidable in the world for the 
foreseeable future. The navy that is the second most powerful is not as clear. The 
modernization of Russia’s submarine force certainly extends the amount of time until 
China’s navy supplants the RFN. Mere modernization of RFN submarines, however, will 
not long hold off PLAN increase in strength due mostly to Chinese ship production rates. 
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III. DEEP-WATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUBMARINES AND 
OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH VESSELS 
As established in chapter two, Russia has demonstrated an increasing resolve to 
project its naval power into the North Atlantic. It has accomplished this primarily through 
the robust deployment of Yasens, and the much older Akula- and Sierra-class submarines. 
Activity from the RFN suggest Russia’s aim is to challenge the status quo and defy the 
powers, which have long dominated the water connecting Europe and North America.  
Unlike the ambitious deployment of Yasen and other Russian SSNs, the RFN 
generally keep the submarines, which belong to the Northern Fleet’s (NF) 29th Special 
Purpose Submarine Brigade closer to Russia’s territorial seas. The novel organization’s 
missions are heavily guarded in secrecy. Although these unique submarines may not 
outwardly appear as threatening as Yasen-class submarines, they are more suited to carry 
out various unconventional tasks. If left unchecked, these submarines may have the ability 
to impose consequences upon NATO and the West.  
This chapter will focus on three RFN special vehicles and their potential 
contributions to future Russian efforts. First, this chapter will evaluate the Kalitka, which 
is the most capable deep-water special operations submarine (DWSOS) belonging to the 
29th Special Purpose Submarine Brigade. In addition, this chapter will evaluate the 
mothership submarine that operates and tends Kalitka, the Belgorod. This chapter also 
evaluates Russia’s most notable oceanographic research vessel (ORV), the Yantar, which 
belongs to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Main Directorate of Underwater 
Research.79  Although Russian ORVs are not pure underwater instruments they are often 
manned underwater vehicle MUV and remotely operating underwater drone ROUD 
capable, which may provide them with robust underwater capabilities. While ORVs serve 
as a supporting appendage for the RFN, they are integral to Russia’s undersea program 
overall. ORV platforms broaden Russia’s undersea capacity by fielding missions, for which 
submarines would obviously be unsuitable. Therefore, any exclusion from evaluating 
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ORVs would result in a less clear understanding of the totality of Russia’s undersea 
program and the capabilities it provides the state of Russia. 
A. DEEP-WATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUBMARINES 
The Kalitka, hull AS-12, was initially designed in the 1980s, but its completion was 
delayed decades due to setbacks brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union.80  AS-12, 
often referred to by its nickname Losharik, was finally commissioned in 2006.81 The 
submarine’s internal design consists of seven titanium sphere hulls joined in succession.82  
The unique design of the connected titanium spheres drew an obvious comparison to that 
of the Russian cartoon horse made of balls called Losharik.83  The internal titanium spheres 
reportedly allow the manned submarine to dive to the extreme depth of 20,000 feet.84   
Kalitka and its mothership operate from the secretive Arctic base, Olenya Guba.85  
The purpose of the motherships, or “nuclear deep-water stations,” is to transport the smaller 
specialty submarine to the areas around the world wherever their unique skill set is required 
along the seabed.86  The motherships transport the DWSOS by tending them to their 
underside.87 
On 1 July 2019, Kalitka was underway with its mothership, Belgorod, roughly 60 
miles east of Norway when tragedy struck. The Kalitka, a key pillar for the 29th Special 
Purpose Submarine Brigade caught fire, resulting in the death of 14 of its elite crew.88  The 
incident near Ura Bay has shined a light on the obscure specialty submarine.89  A few 
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fishermen from Norway informed local media they witnessed the submarine surface, and 
the subsequent transferring of bodies from Kalitka to Belgorod, BS-64.90   
A perplexing detail emerged from the fateful incident, which surrounded Kalitka’s 
crew: they were all officers.91  Unlike a typical submarine crew, Kalitka’s crewmembers 
are referred to as Hydronauts.92  The line of demarcation is unclear between a submariner 
and a Hydronaut. The distinction in title, however, suggest Hydronauts are not ordinary 
submariners, but a group of impressive individuals that are more advanced professionally. 
The unusual makeup of Kalitka’s crew adds peculiarity to the mission it performs along 
with that of other DWSOS, such as Paltus. Why was it necessary for the Kalitka to have 
such a senior crew on board?  The all-officer crew of Kalitka may imply its mission was 
of great importance, unusually demanding in technical terms, or that it demanded a 
heightened level of secrecy. 
The first media outlet to report the tragedy was SeverLife.ru, around midnight the 
same day.93  SeverLife.ru reported that between 10 and 14 people died, however, the article 
was subsequently removed.94 The following week, Russia’s state-run Rossiya 1 TV 
proclaimed Kalitka’s mission was to aid in the substantiation of Russia’s bid to enlarge its 
territorial waters in the Arctic region.95 Andrei Grigoryev, a Russian correspondent 
reported: 
The vessel was conducting planned bathymetric research. Bathymetry—the 
underwater analogue of topography—is a study of bottom topography. This 
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data from deep-water submersibles, which literally touch the shelf, are 
much more accurate and useful.96 
There is no reason to dismiss Grigoryev’s declaration about Kalitka’s mission. The 
application of Russia’s submarines to advance the state’s interest may be assumed, and 
Russia has been vigorous in asserting its claim to the Artic region. For example, in early 
2016, Russia applied to the United Nations (UN) to extend its territory in the Arctic 
region.97  The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is reviewing 
Russia’s application. If the UN Commission decides in Russia’s favor, Russia may be 
allocated up to an additional 750,000 square miles of the Arctic Shelf.98  Russia has 
indicated it would advance economically as the Arctic region is believed to harbor 12 
percent of the world’s oil reserves.99  If Kalitka was simply conducting a mission to aid in 
the advancement of the state, it is difficult to understand why the state-run media would 
wait an entire week before reporting the accident. 
A second wave of curiosity and skepticism befell the incident and more broadly the 
Kalitka when President Putin posthumously awarded military medals to all 14 
crewmembers who were killed.100  Remarkably, four received the nation’s highest honor, 
Hero of the Russian Federation.101  Detailed information of the crew’s conduct is mainly 
sealed in secrecy, along with specifics that may clarify what compelled Putin to honor four 
of the Hydronauts with the status of Hero of the Russian Federation. Among the few details 
that have been made known include, the men that died, one of which was the submarine’s 
Commanding Officer, stayed in the battery compartment where the fire broke out.102  
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redundancy in power to propulsion. Following the incident, and by way of demonstrating 
the level of heroism displayed by the submarine’s crew, a naval Officer commented at a 
funeral that the crew of the Kalitka had “prevented a planetary catastrophe.”103 
The explanation of Kalitka’s mission provided by Russia’s state-run TV is 
predictably accommodating to Russia. Its claim mitigates any embarrassment suffered by 
the state. Provided there are several anomalies that surround the events that occurred on 1 
July 2019, there is reason to further examine if Russia’s state-run TV claim is legitimate 
and accepted as fact.  
Given Russia’s pivot towards more aggressive geopolitics, it is conceivable 
Kalitka’s mission may have had nefarious elements. For example, the unique submarine is 
reportedly capable of severing undersea cables and destroying other undersea 
infrastructure.104  Western military analysts also claim the submarine can tap and monitor 
undersea communication cables and spy on foreign submarines.105  It was reported at least 
two Russian submarines were in the area of Kalitka when the fire broke out onboard, an 
SSGN and SSBN.106  If Kalitka  was participating in bathymetric research, would its 
mothership require two additional submarines in company?  
Although there were no reported communication outages attributed to disrupted 
undersea cables following the incident, it is possible Kalitka was involved in a training 
mission that stopped short of severing any cables. It is also not out of the realm of 
possibilities the submarine attempted, or even succeeded, at tapping communication cables 
when disaster struck. If Kalitka sunk overtop such cables while still connected to one, the 
evidence would be beyond incriminating, if it were to be exposed by an advanced 
specialized western submarine, like the USS Jimmy Carter. In such circumstances, 
Kalitka’s crew likely would have been desperate to prevent such revelation as it would 
humiliate and damage Russia politically. It may be hypothesized that western intelligence 
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sources understand if Russia’s state-run television claim is legitimate or not. Unclassified 
governmental sources, however, have not yet added clarity to the incident. 
B. OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH VESSELS 
ORVs are widely recognized as vessels that operate within the parameters of 
scientific research commissioned to advance the interest of the state whose flag they fly. 
They lack any obvious offensive capabilities, such as torpedoes or cruise missiles, therefore 
they cannot be considered warships.107  Aside from their exterior structure being topped 
by a mixture of distinct radar and antennas, ORVs appear nonlethal and unassuming.  
The Yantar was commissioned in 2015 and recognized as Russia’s most capable 
ORV and is primarily employed as the mothership for manned and unmanned deep-sea 
submersibles.108  Yantar lacks offensive arms, therefore it may be incapable of directly 
projecting military power. On several occasions these Russian ORVs have been located 
operating near strategic defense assets, however. The location they have deployed to may 
suggest the ORVs are not confined to the conduct of scientific missions. For example, in 
2015 Yantar was located near underwater communication apparatuses by a U.S. submarine 
base.109  It was later located off the coast in Syria, positioned overtop undersea 
communication cables, some of which link to Europe.110  Ihor Kabanenko, President of 
the Ukranian Advanced Research Project Agency, wrote about some of the key instruments 
Yantar carries on board, which may suggest what the vessel’s true intentions were when it 
operated near vital undersea infrastructure. Kabanenko affirmed: 
The Yantar carries two modest Russian Rus- and Konsul-class manned 
underwater vehicles (MUV) capable of diving up to 6,000 meters for 10–12 
hours at a time. These MUVs feature manipulators with cable-cutting tools. 
Moreover, they themselves carry remotely operated underwater tasks: from 
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object inspection and destruction, to delivering various devices to the 
seafloor or lifting objects to the surface.111 
The RFN may mean to deploy the Yantar to areas equipped with important seabed 
apparatuses to offer its crew missions, which support building their confidence and skills 
through the deployment of the MUVs and ROUDs. Yantar’s missions may further project 
the RFN’s power and signal to western forces it possesses the means to impair vital seabed 
infrastructure.  
Although not considered as advanced as the Yantar, the Admiral Vladimirsky has 
recently undergone modernization. As part of the ship’s modernization package, it received 
upgraded acoustic, biological, physical, and geophysical survey equipment.112  
Additionally, the Admiral Vladimirsky has conducted multiple expeditions across several 
key theaters for Russia.113  The Admiral Vladimirsky, if operating in concert with Yantar, 
could likely provide each ship with additional operational flexibility through the means of 
redundancy in sensors. 
The Yantar is superior to Kalitka, in time of service and likely material condition. 
Although the submarine is reportedly capable of diving to the depth of 20,000 feet, it may 
be doubtful its Hydronauts would attempt to ride it that far down. John Pike, director of 
the think tank GlobalSecurity.org, noted the fire onboard Kalitka is representative of the 
long, systemic problems that have plagued the RFN for decades, including corrupt 
contractors and insufficient quality control.114  It is not evident that the Yantar is immune 
from such problems, but it does incorporate more advanced technology than the Kalitka, 
presumably including its safety systems. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The exceptional depths, as which that Kalitka is capable of operating may have the 
potential to create mismatches for more conventional forces and modern nuclear 
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submarines. For example, naval historians Norman Polmar and K.J. Moore stated there 
was “nothing in U.S. fleet to match” Kalitka’s depths.115  Therefore, it may be possible the 
DWSOS can carry out nefarious operations in the extreme depths of the oceans with little 
resistance. Kalitka’s mothership could transport the little submarine to any seabed 
infrastructure or communication cables, which were laid at a depth that exceeds Western 
submarine dive limits. Once in position, Kalitka could detach and proceed to tap and 
monitor undersea cables. The Kalitka’s true position would likely be difficult to determine 
while operating at such extreme depths within the Deep Sound Channel (DSC) because of 
the behavior of sound in water. For example, because of the greater the depth, at which 
Kalitka operates, adversarial Sound Navigation and Ranging (SONAR) would be subjected 
to additional attenuation from absorption and scattering. Although these factors may 
prevent the Kalitka from being detected its mothership would have to pursue a different 
strategy of evasion, since it cannot dive to such extreme depths.  
Although, the U.S. Navy has refrained from commissioning a submarine manned 
by Hydronauts, it has attempted to mitigate any disadvantage by means of technology. 
Peter Lobner, a former U.S. submarine electronic officer, has remarked that, “we have 
nothing except unmanned vehicles,” which operate at the depths Kalitka is capable of.116   
An apparent Achilles heel for DWSOS is the absence of any credible capability in 
self-defense.  The disparity between DWSOS and those of modern Western submarines 
such as the Virginia class, often necessitates the deployment of DWSOS escorted by 
multiple assets to safeguard them from lurking threats. As noted earlier, when the fire broke 
out on Kalitka, it was accompanied by two submarines in addition to Belgorod. In 
proximity of Kalitka was an Oscar-II SSGN and a Typhoon SSBN, the Dmitriy 
Donskov.117  The Dmitriy Donskov was said to have participated in an anti-submarine 
exercise.118  There was no official affirmation surrounding the intent behind the Oscar-
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II’s underway.119  Russian defense analyst, H. I. Sutton concluded it is possible the mixture 
of submarines could have carried out separate operations, or that they served as a defense 
picket for Kalitka and Belgorod.120  Therefore, if Belgorod deployed in the company of 
more capable units, it could signify Kalitka means to accomplish a mission with heightened 
significance.   
Following the tragedy that ensued onboard Kalitka, and all of the media attention 
it garnered, the RFN may find it more appealing and practical to use ORVs in place of 
DWSOS in the future. The Yantar’s MUVs are capable of diving as deep as Kalitka. In 
addition to this feat, Yantar’s  ROUD, such as the Pantera Plus can physically separate 
from the mothership, offering additional undersea capability.121  A shortcoming the RFN 
can expect to endure if it pivots away from DWSOS and further embraces ORVs is the 
minimization of secrecy in underwater operations. The ORV, Yantar may arguably be more 
capable than the submarine, Kalitka, however, when the Yantar and other Russian ORVs 
operate, they do so overtly. If the Yantar took part in any operation that led to the 
destruction of Western seabed infrastructure, Russia may fall short of plausible deniability. 
Today’s Russia, post-Crimea annexation, however, may not be deterred by an absence of 
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IV. UNDERSEA HYBRID WARFARE 
In the wake of the Color Revolutions a swell of leaders with antagonistic views 
towards Russia came into power throughout the post-Soviet space along Russia’s western 
flank.122   Russian leaders sensed they were being boxed in by larger forces, to include the 
U.S, which at the time proclaimed a global strategy of regime change.123  The Kremlin 
perceived it was the U.S.’s intention to manufacture an environment along Russia’s border 
with characteristics capable of inducing a regime change in Russia.124  The Color 
Revolutions did not bring a premature termination to Putin’s administration, however, but 
birthed a new modus operandi for his foreign policy: hybrid warfare. 
In 2013, Putin’s Chief of General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov wrote: 
Armed conflicts, including those associated with the so-called revolutions 
in North Africa and the Middle East, have demonstrated, that a prosperous 
state, in a matter of months or even days, may turn into a bitter armed 
conflict, becoming a victim of foreign intervention, falling into chaos, a 
humanitarian catastrophe and into civil war.125 
Presumably, the value in this unconventional strategy immediately appealed to the 
Kremlin, as Russia’s military arsenal is overall substantially smaller in comparison to that 
of the Soviet Union’s at its peak. On Russia’s comprehension of this reality, Katarzyna 
Zysk, the lead for the Center for Security Policy at the Norwegian Institute for Defense 
Studies in Norway stated, “bear in mind what Moscow does not want to do: become directly 
involved in any extended conflict with NATO. Russia does not have the resources to win 
that kind of conflict.”126  Russia’s adaption to hybrid warfare suggests the Kremlin may 
assess a demonstration of conventional warfare could result in the disruption of the status 
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quo to Putin’s regime. The marginalized status of Russia’s political and military influence 
may also have induced its leaders to reimagine the tactics it applies to foreign and domestic 
policy.  
The Ukraine-European Association Agreement was the catalyst for the Kremlin to 
implement hybrid warfare in effort to subdue paranoia that developed from shifting 
political plates in Russia’s “near abroad.”  The materialization of pro-Democracy 
sentiments in “Little Russia”—as Ukraine was once known -- compelled the Kremlin to 
forcefully intervene, as its leaders perceived the appeal of democracy would inevitably 
spread to Russia.127   
Russia continues to supplant routine diplomatic conduct with a variety of 
aggressive operations beneath the threshold which may demand a military response from 
the West. It has so far refrained from doing so in the undersea theater. This chapter means 
to examine the possibilities that may exist there, specifically with respect to existing seabed 
floor infrastructure and its supporting apparatus, which emerge as a less than resilient target 
for aggression. It also seeks to determine the diverse means, by which Russia may pursue 
hybrid warfare to the undersea theater.  
The vulnerability of seabed cables and undersea infrastructure have long been 
realized. In 1850, the first undersea cable was laid in the English Channel, connecting 
England and France.128  Three days after it began operation it was severed by French 
fishermen.129  Although the material condition of these cables have improved over time, 
they remain undefended in general, and largely indefensible detail. As a result of the 
combination in their vulnerability and overall contribution to the societies, in which they 
benefit, undersea cables have been an obvious target in the minds of adversaries for 
decades. James Lewis, director, and senior fellow of the Technology and Public Program 
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., remarked:  
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During the Cold War, lots of attention was paid to undersea cables. It was 
widely believed a number of cables would be severed prior to any invasion 
during the Cold War, as doing so would result in a minimization of effective 
communication and the elevated fog of war.130   
Zysk confirmed a degradation to communications in the event of a conflict is still 
considered paramount to Russian leadership. Zysk stated, “Russia’s president, Vladimir V. 
Putin, and his commanders have increasingly stressed the importance of controlling the 
flow of information to keep the upper hand in a conflict.131  Therefore, even though the 
Cold War concluded decades ago, the significance of the cables likely remains evident to 
the Kremlin. 
There are approximately five hundred thousand miles of cable carrying data along 
the ocean floor between the continents.132  The amount of cable laid differs by region, and 
as a result, operational redundancy varies widely. Undersea cable breaks are not unusual, 
but due to varying levels of redundancy the impact of their breaks is not uniform. For 
example, in December 2008, three cables in the Mediterranean Sea broke in succession, 
which resulted in the Gulf states network and e-mail capacity being reduced by 80 
percent.133  The interruption in service extended all the way to Malaysia, and Taiwan, 
albeit with reduced severity.134  Just as the cables have proven to be sensitive to mariner 
operations, breakages have been caused by natural phenomenon as well, such as 
earthquakes. In late 2006, when an earthquake occurred in the Luzon Strait, the 
surrounding region suffered a 90 percent reduction to telecommunications.135 
In areas with heavy amounts of cables, breakage is less significant, as the service 
can be rerouted up to a point, like a train switching tracks. All cables, however, must in the 
end converge in hubs where redundancy is reduced, and vulnerability rises accordingly. 
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James Geary, author and deputy curator of the Nieman Foundation of Journalism at 
Harvard wrote , “It is in the hundreds of internet hubs around the world, concrete landing 
points where these cables come ashore and branch back out again through terrestrial 
networks.”136  If nefarious actors wanted to disrupt the flow of the U.S.’s communication 
capacity, they would likely need to compromise the operations of a few of these service 
hubs, which are heavily safeguarded for this very reason. 
A major service hub in America is the Terremark facility in Miami, Florida.137  
Geary says the Terremark facility, “is among the most wired sites in the world.”138  Nearly 
all internet traffic from North America to Latin America is directed to the Terremark 
facility.139  The facility is one of dozens within America, which serve as a critical artery 
to the operation of the internet.140  On the importance of these hubs such as the Terremark 
facility, Geary concluded: 
The hubs are both a strength and a weakness. If one hub fails, the others can 
take up the slack. If several hubs go out of service, however, whole sections 
of the network can become isolated.141  
Unlike seabed cables, which can be uprooted on accident by dragging anchors and fishing 
nets, the internet hubs are relatively resilient to attacks. The Terremark facility is 
constructed with seven-inch, steel-reinforced concrete walls and its internal activity is 
closely monitored, similar to that of a “NASA-like network-operation center.”142 
Attempts to cripple the U.S.’s flow of information by means of undersea hybrid 
warfare may be too arduous of a task for Russia to consider. It is probable the infrastructure 
of the Balkans, the Baltic states, or the Middle East is more fragile, however, and therefore 
easier to influence. For example, on the Balkans, Bechev wrote: 
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In March 2017, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, singled out Russia as a troublemaker 
and a challenger. “The Balkans can easily become one of the chessboards 
where the big power game can be played,”.143  
Therefore, the critical seabed infrastructure, which supports the Balkans may be one of the 
areas most susceptible to hybrid warfare. 
The external support pillars for seabed infrastructure may not be as impregnable as 
the service hubs like the Terremark facility in Florida. The personnel that repair seabed 
cable breaks are not ordinary technicians, but a select group of professionals that operate 
specialized equipment. For example, the crew of the Wave Sentinel is operated by the 
undersea installation and maintenance firm, Global Marine Systems, based out of the 
U.K.144  The Wave Sentinel deploys a ten-million dollar, six-ton lunar lander-like remote 
operate vehicle (ROV), which is critical for repairs. Unfortunately, the repair of seabed 
cables is often a time-consuming and exacting task. One exceptionally difficult repair 
mission entailed the Wave Sentinel operating for 12 days off the coast of southern England, 
in which the crew worked 12 hour shifts.145  Once the damaged wire is located, the ROV 
cuts completely through it, and transports both ends of the cable to the surface.146  On 
board, the crew properly reconnects the cable, confirms its functionality, then lowers it 
back to the seafloor.147  The work for crews such as Wave Sentinel’s is unending, as seabed 
cables regularly break from normal mariner operations.148  Russian undersea hybrid 
warfare could easily take the shape of sabotage missions carried out under the guise of 
fishermen operating nets and dragging anchors, intentionally severing cables.  
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A. CORRUPTION, COERCION, AND OTHER MALIGN INFLUENCE 
Russia has multiple defense assets that possess the capability to sabotage 
infrastructure on the seabed, to include its DWSOS and advanced Oceanographic Research 
Vessels (ORV)s such as the Yantar. If Russia’s undersea aggression was consistent with 
its recent practice of hybrid warfare, it is probable Russia would not rely exclusively on 
defense assets. Presumably, Russia would incorporate an aggregate of forces and methods 
to include corruption and coercion.  
Although corruption of key personnel used as a tool of foreign policy is not a recent 
development in Russia, its use has proliferated recently. Bobo Lo, former head of the 
Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House and author of, Russia and the New World 
Disorder, wrote: 
the Kremlin’s approach to soft power is more akin to ‘soft coercion.’  This 
is characterized by the surgical exploitation of weakness (for example, 
corruption) in the governance of neighboring states; the cultivation of inter-
elite business networks; the funding of political parties sympathetic outlets. 
Such methods resemble more closely the ‘active measures’ (aktivnye 
meropriyatia) pursued during the Soviet era than they do the Western liberal 
notion of influence through example. Most of all they arise out of the realist 
belief that true power comes from the ruthless deployment of political, 
economic, and strategic assets.149 
Sectors in the undersea theater are not immune to Russia’s soft power. Russia may attempt 
to apply its soft power in the form of corruption to those that physically maintain the seabed 
infrastructure. By corrupting maintenance crews, such as those that serve on board Wave 
Sentinel, Russia could delay or compromise needed repairs. A delay to repairing cables 
would likely be a temporary dilemma. It is probable, however, if difficulty in undersea 
repairs persisted, additional repair crews and resources would be diverted from minor 
problems to the most obvious obstruction to the flow of data. A corrupted crew’s charade 
would inevitably conclude when honest crews arrived on station and took matters into their 
own hands. The pursuit of corruption targeting major internet hubs is not out of the realm 
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of possibilities, however, it would be unequivocally more difficult due to their robust 
organization. 
In addition to corruption and coercion, Russia has found value in the employment 
of mercenary military forces in pursuit of Russian national interest, without operating under 
its state flag. For example, U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Heidi Berg, the director of intelligence 
for AFRICOM asserted there is a minimum of 14 Russian fighter aircraft attached to Libya 
airfields, Al Jufra and Al Khadim, operated by Wagner Group.150  Diana Stancy Correll, 
author for Military Times and the Washington Examiner described the Wagner Group as, 
“A private military company that U.S. officials have warned has close ties to the Kremlin 
and is headed by a former Russian intelligence officer”.151  If Russia is able to partly mask  
its direct support for private militaries in Libya, it is conceivable Russia could finance a 
private group to take part in undersea hybrid warfare. William G. Glenney, a senior military 
analyst wrote: 
Unlike the U.S. government-funded search for the SS Titantic by Robert 
Ballard, Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen independently found USS 
Indianapolis in over 15,000 feet of water in the Philippine Sea. The 
capabilities to sense, understand, and act in the deep ocean are available to 
anyone with a reasonable amount of money to buy them.152 
Covertly financing private submersible sabotage missions may well appeal to the Kremlin. 
The Kremlin, with the help of Russian state-run media, could perpetuate the belief there is 
no connection between the state and any privateers. 
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The manipulation or sabotage of seafloor infrastructure that supports industrialized 
western countries such as the U.S. may result in a temporary reduction to the overall 
network capacity. In all probability, the most severe damage possible of such acts to the 
West are consistent with a loss of functionality in limited regions. The application of 
undersea hybrid warfare may pose only limited risk to the developed West, but it is likely 
to be more problematic to other areas, in which the U.S. has vested interests, for example, 
in areas such as Syria, Africa and the Middle East. James Lewis confirmed, “the January-
February cuts affected the ability of CENTCOM to send communications from 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Video and data streams are crucial parts of military operations, and 
they need that fiber-optic cable infrastructure.” The obstruction of a tactical picture in 
operation theaters caused by lost video and data streams may aide Russia and boost its 
assertiveness. Furthermore, such an amplification of the fog of war may allow Russia to 
pursue more overtly aggressive actions with higher confidence that their early moves may 
go undetected or be subject to a more limited response that would otherwise be expected. 
For Russia to conduct hybrid warfare in the undersea theater and impact nations 
with more severity than prolonged data download times, would probably require the tactic 
to be executed in concert with other antagonistic plots such as the corruption of cable repair 
crews to prolong interruptions in service. Geary affirms the danger of an interruption in 
service, “Given how much of our financial, commercial and social lives have moved 
online, the repercussions from such as assault—and a resulting widespread failure—would 
be immense.”153  The effects of undersea hybrid warfare may be exacerbated if timed with 
some other disruptive events, such as a global pandemic. COVID-19 induced negative 
impacts across large swaths of businesses. The oil sector proved to not be immune, as the 
first time in history, on 20 April 2020, oil traded in negative territory.154  The disruption 
of internet traffic may cause similar negative impact in various economic areas.  
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The employment of private submarines or remotely operated underwater drones 
(ROUD) could prove to be difficult for the West to counter initially. The employment of 
individual privatized submersibles may present difficulties to intelligence and law 
enforcement institutions similar to the difficulties “lone-wolf” attackers present. The 
ability to assess which individuals have the means to carry out underwater attacks could be 
a daunting enterprise for intelligent services.  
Russia has demonstrated its determination to assert itself as a revisionist power and 
has consistently defied traditional norms. Its recent actions suggest it means to disrupt the 
forces that have attempted to preserve order throughout the world. Although undersea 
cables lie largely defenseless for all practical purpose, Russia has refrained from their 
sabotage; but why? 
If Russia waged an undersea hybrid warfare campaign directed at the West, it seems 
improbable that the result would immediately be debilitating to the status quo of civil 
societies. It would, however, likely impose several difficulties that would need to be 
acknowledged, and an adequate response organized. Satellites deliver less than ten percent 
of all internet data, therefore an ongoing undersea hybrid warfare campaign would 
eventually devastate the flow of information if left completely unchecked.155  In the event 
Russia did go ahead with such actions, a measured response that did not provoke future 
hostilities would present a formidable challenge for the U.S. and its allies. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This study of the nature of Russian submarine employment leads to three 
revelations: a prudent effort by the Russians to replace numbers with technology, the 
subsequent leverage of that technological improvement to blunt American strategic 
innovation, and lastly a policy that aims to advance a historical tradition of expanding 
influence abroad. This concluding chapter will illustrate all three revelations through a 
sequence of topical discussions to show how Russia’s smaller, yet improved, submarine 
force may be profitably employed. The intent is to raise awareness of latent capabilities 
that the Russian Navy could employ to frustrate and fracture western strategic efforts. 
This concluding chapter will first discuss the long-standing preference, first 
established by the Soviets, to operate in a fundamentally different way than rival U.S. 
submarines. Russia’s modern submarines have largely continued to honor the strategy that 
was put in place during Secretary General Joseph Stalin’s tenure. This chapter then 
demonstrates Russia’s extension of its underwater presence in the Atlantic Ocean. Russian 
submarines do not operate with the unrealistic expectation of ever dominating the theater, 
but instead strive to incrementally undermine the West’s confidence in maritime 
operations. Next, this conclusion discusses how submarines are vital to Russian efforts to 
mitigate American strategic innovation as exemplified by programs like Prompt Global 
Strike (PGS). Subsequently, this chapter discusses how Russia’s Deep-Water Special 
Operations Submarines (DWSOS), while likely an insignificant threat to the West, are 
nevertheless integral to Russia’s efforts to expand its influence. Finally, this chapter offers 
areas of future research that could further explore the issues raised in this thesis. 
Submarines represented an integral element for the Soviet Navy and remain equally 
essential to the Russian Navy. Since the beginning of the Cold War, Soviet leadership 
understood the value submarines offered, and the various roles they may have played to 
counter the West. The Soviet Union’s ambitions for its navy did not consist of a submarine 
force that equaled or surpassed the tonnage of the U.S. Navy, nor did the considerable 
adaption of submarines into its naval architect transform the Soviet Union to function more 
like a traditional maritime power, such as the UK or U.S. With an overall smaller and 
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inferior naval force than the West, the Soviet Union prioritized lighter platforms that could 
be used to counter the U.S. fleet in small tactical battles, and resist a strategy that would 
depend upon large fleet-on-fleet conflicts. The same is true regarding the modern Russian 
Navy and Russia’s geopolitical posture.  
General Secretary Joseph Stalin’s preference for a navy whose main pillars were 
cruisers and submarines has never been fundamentally changed by his successors, despite 
the fact that the number of large Russian surface combatant vessels has significantly 
declined over the years. Stalin believed submarines could be used to threaten the U.S.’s sea 
lines of communication (SLOC).156  General Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev, whose naval 
philosophy was closely aligned with Stalin’s, proclaimed, “I believe in submarines.”157   
President Vladimir Putin maintains a similar vision for their use. Following the 
commissioning of the modern Yasen submarines, Russia has established its capability of 
threatening western SLOCs within the Atlantic Ocean. This is a recent development. The 
Atlantic remained a theater dominated by western forces for decades upon the Soviet 
Union’s breakup. Yasen submarines have once again allowed Russia to contest western 
domination. They have demonstrated Russia’s increasing masterly of quietening 
technology and proven to be a serious competitor for U.S. nuclear submarines. American 
submarines can no longer transit from the U.S.’s east coast to the Mediterranean Sea 
without the increasing probability of a Russian submarine patrolling within striking 
distance. 
Russia’s Navy is significantly constrained by limited resources and has crafted a 
strategy that does not require strategic innovation to achieve deterrence, even while 
neutralizing technological achievements from the West. In addition to threatening the 
West’s SLOCs, Russia’s submarines are employed to counter western technological 
advancements such as Prompt Global Strike (PGS). Rod Thornton, author, and editor of 
Defence-in-Depth, summarized PGS as:   
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PGS promised to provide the United States with the capability of launching 
a devastating non-nuclear surprise attack on Russia. It is designed to work 
on the basis that 6,000 cruise missiles, all launched within one hour, would 
be aimed at operational and strategic targets (including nuclear weapons 
silos) within Russia.158  
Russia likely does not have a credible method of defending against a PGS strike. It seeks 
to deter one by threatening a retaliatory strike against a major city, such as New York or 
Washington. Michael Kofman, Director of the Russia Studies Program for the Center for 
Naval Analysis proclaimed:  
Russian strategic operations envision conventional strikes, single or 
grouped, against critical economic, military, or political objects. These may 
be followed by nuclear demonstration, limited nuclear strikes, and theater 
nuclear warfare.159   
As Russia’s nuclear Yasen submarines progress in quality and demonstrate an 
increased potential to operate undetected further into the Atlantic, they theoretically 
advance Russia’s ability to deter a PGS attack by maintaining a position at sea that places 
major economic centers in the U.S. within range of the weapons on board. Russian 
submarines can deliver a strike to major strategic economic centers in the West, and 
because of this capability Russia achieves an appreciable level of deterrence from an array 
of threats against which has no credible practicable defense. Therefore, the successful 
development of a new submarine missile, Khishchnik or Predator missile, intended for 
Russia’s nuclear submarines may further act as a deterrent force against PGS. Once armed 
with Predator missiles, Russian submarines will be able to patrol at a farther distance from 
major economic centers along the east coast of the U.S. while expanding Russia’s 
capability of offering a retaliatory strike.160   
Russia’s DWSOS and Oceanographic Research Vessels (ORV) represent no direct 
threat to the U.S. advanced nuclear submarine force, but they are nevertheless instruments 
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capable of advancing Russia’s historical tradition of expansion. Russia continues to 
maintain its small fleet of DWSOS and ORV in part because they can perform the sort of 
ostensibly scientific and exploratory actions that help to legitimization Russia’s Arctic 
claim. Following Russia’s hostilities in eastern Europe, Russia’s ambition to increase its 
influence is a real threat to its neighbors and the overall stability of the region. Although a 
northern expansion may not result in a large displacement of persons, it would further 
monopolize natural resources in a region where Russia is already dominant. A revisionist 
Russia that assumes disproportionate control of the resource rich region of the Artic may 
compel Europe to fully accept Russia as its primary energy supplier, and potentially 
weaken transatlantic strategic partnerships.  
If not for their role in the vital mission to demonstrate similarities between the Artic 
shelf and Russia’s territory, Russia may deem it more prudent to discontinue DWSOS and 
ORV operations. The extent of damage that DWSOS and ORVs can inflict on seabed 
infrastructure is insignificant for most industrialized countries, though they may pose a 
threat to states that are supported by a less robust seabed infrastructure. Therefore, DWSOS 
and ORVs do offer a secondary advantage to Russia through reduction of the flow of 
information to areas where the U.S. has an interest, such as Syria and the Middle East. 
Restricting the flow of critical information in regions may result in Russia being able to 
maintain an offensive, or at least meddlesome, posture, as it has done of late. Russia 
continues to dock the aged specialized submarines at repair inlets and thrust valuable 
resources at them in effort to preserve their longevity. Presumably, Russia will maintain 
the strategy of keeping the older DWSOSs serviceable, as it does not have seem to 
affordable or realistic alternatives, such as the pursuit of research and development via 
underwater autonomous drones. 
Over time, there may arise a few adverse factors that may challenge Russia, upset 
the current trajectory of Russia’s submarine force, and possibly compel Russia to pivot 
away from its traditional heavy reliance on them. At some point the continued expansion 
of Russia’s submarine program may lead to a breakdown in material conditions elsewhere 
in the fleet. It is also reasonable to wonder whether Russian submarine building can 
preserve its current technical excellence should the submarine fleet be abruptly scaled up.   
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Russia’s need for technically advanced submarines must of course be considered in 
relation to its overall fleet structure. From the 2017 major naval salon, the Russian Navy 
representatives expressed their motivation to increase the size of the smallest ships in 
current inventory, while also foregoing large ship construction projects in excess of 8,000 
tons.161  This suggest Russia’s Navy may be on the brink of making a fundamental shift in 
its overall strategy, if it has not already begun doing so. If the Russian Navy should indeed 
forego construction of large surface combatants, such a move would seem to suggest the 
Navy’s ambition does not include extension of include extension of its blue-water 
capabilities further than what it has achieved recently. A dedicated evaluation of the 
Russian surface fleet would thus provide a further level of context beyond what has been 
attempted in the current study. Additional research in this area would provide better 
understanding of Russia’s ultimate naval ambitions, and whether Russia’s Navy is 
predominantly a defense institution that acts as an appendage for Russia’s land defense, or 
if it harbors aggressive imperial intentions beyond the maintenance of Russian hegemony 
in its “near abroad.” 
This thesis has evaluated Russia’s specialty submarines, but it has not considered 
Russian diesel submarines and the potential improvement of the weapons and other 
systems carried on board. With a credible threat of successful precision strikes from smaller 
diesel submarines, the Russian submarine force may be able to influence its neighbors and 
the West by patrolling in areas closer to its home waters. A thorough evaluation of Russia’s 
diesel submarines, and the capabilities the Khishchnik or Predator missile is expected to 
provide, would lend additional clarity to our general understanding of Russian submarines, 
including how diverse platforms may work in concert. 
Throughout the entirety of this thesis, the flexibility and adaption of Russian 
submarines have been demonstrated. Russia’s submarine force has been employed not to 
achieve sea superiority, but to undermine the West’s. Although Russia’s submarine force 
is insignificant compared to that of the Soviet Union’s fleet, this does not reflect a loss of 
confidence in the platform. The modernized submarines in Russia’s arsenal demonstrates 
 
161 Gorenburg, “What We Learned from the Russian Naval Salon (MSBMC-2017).” 
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Russia’s trust in a smaller force with excellent craftmanship, well able to execute the 
mission of threatening western SLOC in the Atlantic and other adjacent oceans of interest 
for the U.S., such as the Mediterranean and Black Sea. 
Defense in depth was the cornerstone of the Soviet Union’s bastion strategy, in 
which surface vessels provided a screen for submarines.162  Russia still intends that its 
submarine force should provide the country with additional layers of strategic defense, 
arguably more than the Soviet Union did. With fewer available surface combatants, the 
Russian Navy depends chiefly upon the Yasen subs to defend against underwater threats to 
its ballistic missile submarines. Furthermore, as part of Russia’s belief in a layered defense, 
the fast attack subs advance Russia’s growing Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/D2) capability 
in the Black Sea and contest the West’s command of the Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea. 
The abandonment of submarines is all the more unlikely because the Russian Navy is 
largely unprepared to execute amphibious and fixed-wing aircraft carrier operations and 
relies heavily on its submarines for power projection. Whereas in the west, an aircraft 
carrier is the iconic symbol of sea strength, ballistic missile submarines such as the Borei-
class submarines are the equivalent for the Russian Navy. 
As shown in this paper, Russia’s submarine strategy is consistent with a smaller 
overall force that is less advanced than the U.S.’s submarine force. The Russian naval 
document, Foundations 2030, reinforces this assessment. It boldly proclaims that “Russia 
will not tolerate the substantial superiority of any other country’s navy.,”163 while leaving 
the meaning of “substantial” to the reader’s imagination. Russian naval strategy will remain 
reactive to that of the United States and its European neighbors for the foreseeable future. 
Russia’s navy will undoubtedly attempt to counteract any improvements realized in the 
U.S. Navy to the extent it can, given the kind of resource constraints that have already been 
discussed. In this respect a fundamental shift in the U.S. Navy’s architecture may be the 
most likely catalyst to alter the roles Russian submarines perform, or to change the 
composition of Russia’s Navy. History suggests that any fundamental change the U.S. 
 
162 Owen R. Cote Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with 
Soviet Submarines (Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2003). 
163 Bogdanov and Kramnik, The Russian Navy in the 21st Century, 20. 
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Navy undergoes will likely result in the adaption of Russia’s submarine force to mitigate 
whatever gaps in defense that may arise as a consequence.  
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